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Abstract 
This study examines how industry-specific managerial experience affects firms’ 
innovation performance in the context of different institutional environments. Based on 
firm-level data from 27 Central and Eastern European countries we identify a robust 
positive relationship between industry-specific experience of the top-manager and the 
decision to innovate as well as the share of new product-related sales. These effects are 
particularly pronounced for small firms operating outside the European Union or, more 
generally, in institutionally less developed countries. The results suggest that managerial 
experience affects firm innovations largely indirectly, for example, by reducing 
uncertainty about future returns on innovations or by providing knowledge about how to 
cope with institutional shortfalls potentially hampering the commercial success of new 
products. 
 
JEL-Classification: G38, L25, O32, P26 
Keywords:  Corporate Governance, Innovation, Managerial Experience 
 
Contact details: 
Benjamin Balsmeier  
KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics Strategy and Innovation,  
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
phone: +32 16 326 682, e-mail: Benjamin.Balsmeier@kuleuven.be 
Dirk Czarnitzki 
KU Leuven, Department of Managerial Economics Strategy and Innovation,  
Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium 
phone: +32 16 326 906, e-mail: Dirk.Czarnitzki@kuleuven.be 
 
*  Both authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Flemish Science Foundation (grant 
G.0282.10). We also thank Alberto Galasso and the participants of the EARIE 2011, the IIOC 2012 and the 
MSI faculty lunch seminar at KU Leuven for many valuable comments.  
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Several studies support the perception of a strong positive relationship between institutional 
development and economic growth at the country level (e.g. Acemoglu et al., 2002, 2005, 
Barro, 1990, Beck et al., 2005, Claessens & Laeven, 2003, Djankov et al., 2003, Johnson et 
al., 2002, La Porta et al., 1998, 2002). This interrelation can be explained, at least partly, by 
higher or more advanced innovative activities of firms in countries with well-developed 
institutional environments (Romer, 1990, Varsakelis, 2001, Lin et al. 2010). Encouraging 
firms to develop new products is thus recognized as one of the most important mechanisms 
for improving long-run economic performance by scholars and policy makers as well as 
managers. This view is also broadly supported by the existing literature which provides 
robust evidence that innovations have a positive impact on firm productivity (see e.g. Stiglitz, 
1969, Griliches, 1980, Schankerman, 1981, Griliches & Mairesse, 1984, 1990, and Hall & 
Mairesse, 1995, for early, influential studies, or Hall et al., 2010, for a recent survey). As 
corporate innovative activities are one of the most important drivers of long-term firm 
performance it is of great interest to understand how differences in institutional environments 
moderate the decision to innovate and the success of these activities at the firm level.  
Apart from determinants like firm size, market structure, industry (e.g. Scherer, 1984, 
Acs & Audretsch, 1987, 1988, Bertschek & Entorf, 1996), spillovers (e.g. Acs et al., 1994), 
strategy (e.g. Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989) and ownership structure (e.g. Baysinger et al., 
1991, Czarnitzki & Kraft, 2009), recently the top-manager of a firm became another focus in 
research on innovative firm performance (e.g. Barker & Mueller, 2002, Bertrand & Schoar, 
2003, Mackey, 2008, Eggers & Kaplan, 2009 or Galasso & Simcoe, 2011). A firm’s top 
management might be an especially crucial factor to be considered when a firm operates in 
less developed institutional environments, as it is believed, for instance, that managerial 
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knowledge about institutions reduces uncertainty and makes expectations about business 
opportunities more accurate and realistic (Penrose 1959, Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul 
1975, Chetty et al. 2006). Managerial knowledge about how to deal with institutional 
shortfalls and other obstacles on the way to the successful commercialization of new 
inventions naturally increases with past experiences.  
The presumption that managerial experience affects firm behavior has been noted by 
several scholars and empirically confirmed for variables other than innovation (e.g. Kor 
2003, Bach & Smith, 2007, Holmes & Schmitz, 1996, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990, 
Keeley and Roure, 1990). Most empirical papers dealing with managerial experience focus 
on startups and examine the impact of the founders experience on firm performance and 
survival rates, typically showing positive effects (e.g. Pennings et al., 1998, Klepper, 2001, 
Agarwal et al., 2004, Filatotchev et al., 2009). Another related strand of the literature 
recognizes a positive link between experience-based human capital of board members and the 
growth of publicly listed firms (e.g. Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009, Kor & Misangyi, 2008, 
Kor 2003). The link between top-manager experience and innovative firm activities is 
however only rarely analyzed (see Weterings & Koster, 2007, for an exception) and, if so, 
only for one specific industry and not in the context of different institutional environments.  
As experienced managers are likely to have better insights into future business 
opportunities, threats, niche markets (Shane, 2000), products, technologies or market 
development (Helfat & Liebermann, 2002), managerial experience is expected to be 
positively related to innovative activity and its performance. In this study we argue that the 
positive effect of managerial experience on innovative firm activities is presumably more 
pronounced in countries with less developed institutions as firms operating in such 
environments have to rely relatively more on informal agreements, personal reputation and 
knowledge on how to deal with external institutional shortfalls.  
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Previous efforts to disentangle these effects have been limited by the availability of 
comparable firm-level data on managerial experience as well as innovative firm activities in a 
setting of different institutional environments. This study circumvents these former obstacles 
by using the 2008-2009 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
which comprises comparable firm-level data from 27 Central and Eastern European 
countries, across which the state of the institutional environment varies considerably. 
The present study aims at adding new insights to the emerging debate about how much 
top-managers matter for organizational outcomes, emphasizing industry-specific experience 
of the top executive as a largely neglected but important attribute. By exploring the 
moderating role of institutional environments on the link between top-manager experience 
and a firm’s decision to innovate and its success, this study also contributes to the general 
debate on how the institutional environment shapes individual firm behavior (e.g. North, 
1990, Grossmann & Helpman, 1991, Helpman, 1993, Glass & Saggi, 2002, Branstetter et al., 
2006, Filatotchev et al., 2012, Hoskisson et al., 2000, Hoskisson et al., 2012, Meyer and 
Peng, 2005, Peng, 2003, Wright et al., 2005). 
The empirical analysis reveals that managerial experience enhances both the decision to 
innovate and the innovative firm performance, as measured by the share of sales accounted 
for by new products. Further empirical investigations show that having an experienced 
manager is especially beneficial for small firms operating outside the EU and in 
institutionally less developed regions, respectively. We interpret these findings as support for 
the perception that managerial experience is an important factor explaining firms’ innovation 
activities as it helps to identify new business opportunities and substitutes for institutional 
obstacles on the road to commercialization of new products.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the underlying 
theoretical background and existing findings on the interrelation between managerial 
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experience, institutional development and innovation. Section 3 describes the data and 
methods used. In Section 4, the empirical results are presented and discussed. Finally, section 
5 concludes. 
2. Managerial experience, innovation and institutional development 
2.1 Managerial experience and innovation 
Experiences of managers are part of their human capital and comprise technological, 
commercial, organizational and managerial skills and knowledge that managers accumulate 
during their careers (Weterings & Koster, 2007). Such capabilities may serve as an important 
input factor of a firm. As intellectual assets are not easily imitable by rivals, they presumably 
result in a competitive advantage of firms possessing them. Knowledge about how to 
profitably innovate typically requires a good understanding of relevant technologies and 
evolving markets. As new developments and technologies within an industry often follow a 
path-dependent pattern, knowledge about past industry conditions enhance managers’ 
capability to understand current and predict future industry dynamics (Arthur, 1994, Kor & 
Sundaramurthy, 2009)  Hence, industry-specific experience of the top-manager might be 
crucial for the success of corporate innovative activities. This perception is, among others, 
supported by Klepper & Simons (2000) who reveal positive effects of experience in the radio 
industry for successfully entering the TV receiver market. Furthermore, the literature on start-
ups also suggests that industry-specific experiences are particular valuable to improve the 
firm performance of newly founded firms (Garvin, 1983, Klepper, 2001, Agarwal et al., 
2004, Dahl & Reichstein, 2007, Filatotchev et al., 2009). Likewise does the industry specific 
experience of board members, who advise and monitor top executives, help young, listed 
firms to grow faster (Kor, 2009). 
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The managers’ capabilities may be utilized through superior exploitation of firms’ 
available resources. This can happen either in creative manner or with respect to efficiency of 
the innovation process. Experienced managers may have an advantage in anticipating future 
business opportunities, threats, competitive pressure and changes in technology and customer 
demand (Boeker 1997; Helfat & Lieberman, 2002, Kor, 2003, Shane, 2000, Spender, 1989) 
that helps generating original ideas for new product developments. Relatedly, experienced 
managers may have advantages in accessing external resources like skilled labor within an 
industry or suppliers of scarce, highly-specialized or customized goods (Pennings et al., 1998, 
Sorenson, 2003) which might be a necessary input for successful innovation. Information on 
such crucial input factors and how to employ those are not necessarily freely available in the 
market but rather acquired during a career. Long-term industry experience in combination 
with exemplary conduct will also provide the manager with a well-established network to 
horizontally or vertically related firms, contributing to the firm’s reputation (Certo, 2003, 
Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994). This will be conducive to strategic alliances with external 
partners, suppliers and customers and in turn may enhance innovative firm performance 
(Stuart and Sorenson 2003).  
In the present study we are not primarily interested in a specific channel through which 
managerial experience influences innovative firm activities but rather in the general effect of 
industry-specific experience on the decision to innovate and to successfully commercialize 
new products. We assume that the aforementioned factors contribute positively to the firm’s 
capabilities to innovate and these capabilities are positively associated with increasing 
industry-specific experience of the top-manager, on average. Even without knowing the exact 
channel through which managerial experience affects firms’ decision making and 
organizational behavior it seems reasonable to conjecture that top-manager experience 
generally reduces the risk of failure and uncertainty about future returns to innovative firm 
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activities. Both effects should result in higher innovation propensities.
1
 If experienced 
managers indeed improve access to crucial input factors, provide contacts to customers, 
suppliers and scarce labor, this should become also observable in more successful 
commercialization of new products. This leads to our first hypothesis: 
H1a: Managerial experience is positively associated with the likelihood of   
  new product introductions. 
H1b: Managerial experience is positively associated with the commercial success of 
  new product introductions. 
2.2 Institutional development and innovative firm activity  
When managers make decisions on innovations or related firm activities, they are made 
against the background of the specific environment a firm is operating in. It is well known 
that besides firm-specific and industry-specific aspects, corporate strategy is influenced by 
the institutional environment (see e.g. Grossmann & Helpman, 1991, Helpman, 1993, Glass 
& Saggi, 2002, Branstetter et al., 2006, Filatotchev et al., 2012, Hoskisson et al., 2000, 
Hoskisson et al., 2012, Meyer and Peng, 2005, Peng, 2003, Wright et al., 2005) or 
(expectations about) the political and economic stability (see e.g. North, 1990, Barro, 1990, 
Claessens & Laeven, 2003).  
Institutional factors can have a considerable influence on corporate innovation activity, 
because many inventions may require a long-lasting development process until fully 
commercialized. Therefore, well-functioning institutions might be essential for investment 
decisions of firms. For instance, well-designed property rights and effective contract 
enforcement are required in order to ensure the successful commercialization of new product 
or process developments in the post R&D stage (Lin et al., 2010). As rational agents take 
                                                 
1
 See e.g. Czarnitzki and Toole (2011, 2012) for empirical studies showing a negative relationship between 
uncertainty about innovation success and the level of innovation activity at the firm level. 
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these issues into account when investment decisions are made, the state of institutional 
development should matter for innovation activities at the firm-level. 
When countries lack fundamental market supporting institutions, managers and firms 
often have to perform basic functions themselves (Khanna & Palepu, 1997,  
Peng & Luo 2000). Generally, the lower the strength of external institutions, the more 
important becomes the leader of the firm and his or her personal reputation and knowledge 
about how to cope with all kinds of institutional shortfalls and uncertainty towards the future 
economic development (Penrose, 1959, Chetty et al., 2006). Hence, it is likely that 
differences with regard to external institutions also moderate the role of managerial 
experience in innovative firm activities. 
Weak institutional environments are usually associated with rather weak property rights 
protection, a less developed market system, more governmental slack and problems obtaining 
capital for corporate investments. Therefore, a successful business strategy in institutionally 
less developed surroundings has to rely more on trust, personal reputation, established 
relationships, informal contacts and personal information on whom to contact in certain 
situations (Peng & Health 1996, Peng & Luo, 2000, Li & Zhang, 2007). For instance, in 
environments where getting an internet connection, a license for producing and/or selling a 
new product or importing and exporting certain goods depends on asking or even bribing the 
right people, personal knowledge about these issues can be crucial for receiving the 
maximum possible returns to innovative activities. Well established relationships to 
employees, suppliers and customers, which are built up during a career, may help to 
overcome uncertainty and costly negotiations due to weak contract enforcement and property 
rights protection. Furthermore, obtaining capital for corporate investments is particularly 
difficult in weak or differently speaking less market oriented institutional environments (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2008). If managerial experience has the expected positive 
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effects on doing business, banks and other capital providers may take the experience of the 
top-manager positively into account when making lending decisions. A manager’s experience 
may stand for a lower likelihood of bankruptcy. Without any industry-specific experience of 
the top-manager, banks may not be willing to lend money at all. Such an effect would further 
enhance the positive influence of managerial experience on innovative firm activities, as it is 
known that financial constraints due to rather high uncertainty about future returns to 
innovations are one of the main reasons withholding firms from introducing new products.  
As all these issues are arguably more pronounced in weaker institutional environments, 
managerial experience may have a more positive impact on innovative performance in less 
developed countries. In other words, experience may serve as a substitute for some 
institutional shortfalls via offering reputation, trustworthiness, personal contacts and 
knowledge about how to cope with institutional weaknesses. This reasoning leads to our 
second pair of hypotheses to be tested: 
H2a: The positive link between managerial experience and the likelihood to 
introduce new products is especially pronounced in economies with weak 
institutional environments. 
H2b: The positive link between managerial experience and the commercial success 
of new product introductions is especially pronounced in economies with weak 
institutional environments. 
The existing literature on managerial experience has so far focused largely on firm 
foundations and spin-offs, repeatedly finding positive effects. The link between managerial 
experience and corporate innovative activity is however only rarely analyzed. A further 
limitation of the existing literature is that it often relies on data from one specific industry in 
one developed economy. Using firm-level cross-country data from 27 different economies, 
the present study is, to best of our knowledge, the first one that analyzes top-manager 
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experience in such a broad framework. Taking advantage of the fact that the state of 
institutional development varies widely across our sample, we are able to add new insights to 
the interrelation between firm-level innovations, corporate governance and external 
institutional development. 
3. Data, descriptive statistics and methodological remarks 
For our empirical investigation of managerial experience on innovative performance in 
different institutional surroundings we use the 2008-2009 wave of the Business Environment 
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS).
2
 An important feature of the BEEPS data for 
our study is the fact that it provides comparable information on the years of industry-specific 
experience of the top-manager for a large set of firms in different countries. By covering 27 
countries, and among those recent or former transition economies, the status of institutional 
development varies exceptionally high across countries. This enables us to disentangle the 
moderating role of different levels of institutional development on the influence of 
managerial experience on innovative firm performance.  
In particular, we propose to split the sample countries basically into two groups, that is, 
into countries that have a well-developed institutional environment versus those where 
economic freedom might still be restricted due to weak institutional environments. First, we 
suggest that distinguishing between EU member states and other Central and Eastern 
European countries leads to a meaningful differentiation of countries in the sample. It can be 
argued that in EU member states the institutional development is relatively high. This view is, 
for instance, supported by Belke et al. (2009) who report considerable institutional 
improvements for those nine countries that joined the EU within the last decade.  
                                                 
2
 The data is freely available for research purposes at the website of the EBRD 
“http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys/beeps.shtml”. Former waves do not include information 
about managerial experience, so we rely solely on the 2008-2009 wave for our study. See this website also for 
further detailed information on the construction of the survey. 
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As an alternative to the EU vs. non-EU country differentiation, we also collected data on the 
Economic Freedom index developed by ‘The Heritage Foundation’ in partnership with ‘The 
Wall Street Journal’ (hereafter only Heritage Foundation).3 The Heritage Foundation 
measures economic freedom in 184 countries around the world on a scale from 1 to 100 since 
1995. A rating of 1 represents the lowest degree and 100 the highest. The index of economic 
freedom combines 4 sub-categories (each containing 2-3 further sub-indices):  
i. The sub-category ‘Rule of Law’ measures the strength of the property rights and the 
freedom from corruption.  
ii. Ratings of fiscal freedom and governmental spending are combined under the 
‘Limited Government’ category.  
iii. ‘Regulatory Efficiency’ is proxied by indices on business freedom, labor freedom and 
monetary freedom.  
iv. Finally, an ‘Open Markets’ category supplements the former ones with indices on 
trade freedom, investment freedom, and financial freedom.  
The economic freedom rating, that we use to measure the state of institutional 
development, is calculated as the average score of the sub-indices. The underlying research 
and rating process is based on a sophisticated standardized system that involves a crew of 
analysts, senior-level academic advisers and evaluations from various other institutions, e.g. 
the World Bank’s Economist Intelligence Unit or the U.S. Department of Commerce.4 As we 
expect to find that managerial experience matters most for innovative firm activity when 
external institutions are rather weak, alternatively to the EU-membership status we 
consequently identified those firms operating in environments falling under the lowest half of 
                                                 
3
  We also checked alternative sources, e.g. Freedom House indices from http://www.freedomhouse.org and 
data from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. Since we found always high 
correlations between other indices and also between the sub-indices, we only report results based on the 
economic freedom index that combines all major sub-fields relevant for firms’ innovative performance.   
4
 For a detailed description of the underlying methodology see, for instance, the website 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology. 
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the economic freedom rating. Accordingly one sample part consists of all firms incorporated 
in countries with rather weak institutional environments (indicated by ‘WI’), which are 
characterized by an economic freedom score below the median value of 59.9, while all other 
countries fall in the group of rather well developed countries.
5
 
Table 1 shows all covered countries, the number of observed companies per country 
and information on whether the respective country is a member of the EU or has weak 
external institutions (WI) according to the Heritage Foundation’s Economic Freedom Index. 
The data is a cross-sectional random sample of 11,800 firms from 27 Central and Eastern 
European countries.
6
 After removing observations with inconsistent answers in the 
questionnaire or missing values in the variables of interest, the final sample includes 7,806 
observations in total.
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Table 1: Sample overview  
Country Freq. Percent EU-member 
Weak 
institutions 
Country Freq. Percent EU-member 
Weak 
institutions 
Albania 39 0.5 
  
Latvia 207 2.65 EU 
 
Armenia 252 3.23 
  
Lithuania 205 2.63 EU 
 
Azerbaijan 265 3.39 
 
WI Montenegro 83 1.06 
 
WI 
Belarus 195 2.5 
 
WI Poland 262 3.36 EU 
 
Bosnia 257 3.29 
 
WI Romania 370 4.74 EU 
 
Bulgaria 229 2.93 EU 
 
Russia 936 11.99 
 
WI 
Croatia 92 1.18 
 
WI Serbia 323 4.14 
 
WI 
Czech Republic 143 1.83 EU 
 
Slovakia 159 2.04 EU 
 
Estonia 222 2.84 EU 
 
Slovenia 225 2.88 EU 
 
Fyrom 241 3.09 
  
Tajikistan 255 3.27 
 
WI 
Georgia 261 3.34 
  
Turkey 776 9.94 
  
                                                 
5
 All subsequently presented estimations were also performed with different separating values of ‘WI’ but 
showed qualitatively the same results. 
6
 The difference of the institutional development of EU-member countries and non-EU-member countries is also 
supported by significant differences in the indices of the Heritage Foundation measuring economic freedom. 
The EU member countries have, on average a much higher value of institutional development than the non-EU 
members. In addition, the institutional development within the EU is also more harmonized than in the other 
countries as can be seen in the lower standard deviation of the Economic Freedom Index in Table 3. 
7
 As the data in the survey is obtained by personal interviews we also checked for difference in our results when 
less trustable cases are removed as indicated by bad interview/respondent quality. Since we find none, the 
presented results are based on all available observations. We removed one observation where 777,777 
employees in t-3 were reported, because this observation is a clear outlier (next smaller firm has 15,000 
employees in t-3) and would, thus, bias the size effect estimation in our regressions. Finally, we checked 
whether our results are influenced by those few managers who reported more than 50 years of industry-specific 
experience. As we found no meaningful difference in our estimations, we left them in the sample. 
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Hungary 256 3.28 EU 
 
Ukraine 612 7.84 
 
WI 
Kazakhstan 399 5.11 
  
Uzbekistan 341 4.37 
 
WI 
Kyrgyz 201 2.57               
Total number of observations: 7,806 
 
Variables 
As dependent variables we use one binary variable and one continuous variable that 
proxy for corporate innovative performance. These are the only innovation variables that can 
be obtained from the BEEPS for a large sample of firms. The first innovation dummy ‘new 
product/service’ indicates whether a firm has introduced new products or services in the last 
three years. The second variable ‘innovation sales’ approximates the success of those 
innovations, as measured by the share of the last fiscal year’s annual sales that were achieved 
with new products and services introduced during the last three years.
8
  
Our main explanatory variable ‘experience’ is the industry-specific experience of the 
top-manager of each firm, which is calculated as the number of years the top-manager 
worked in the current industry. In the regression analysis we use the logarithm of experience 
in order to allow for diminishing marginal returns of experience on corporate innovative 
activity, incorporating the idea that the most important experiences are made during the first 
years and the additional gain in knowledge becomes less important over time. We will 
estimate the effect of managerial experience on innovative activity, measured by ‘new 
product/service’ and ‘innovation sales’, respectively, for (i) all firms in the sample, (ii) 
separately for firms operating in EU-member states and non-EU-member states (see sample 
                                                 
8
  We acknowledge that both innovation measures may not always indicate a positive outcome, because some 
firms may introduce too many new products to the market or a high proportion of new product related sales 
might be driven by less successful prior products rather than the success of the newly introduced one. As the 
BEEPS data is anonymized we are also not able to match other indicators, e.g. patent data, to address 
unobserved heterogeneity with regard to the radicalness of the indicated innovations. Given the comprehensive 
evidence on positive effects of innovative firm activities on firm performance on average (see e.g. Stiglitz, 1969, 
Griliches, 1980, Schankerman, 1981, Griliches & Mairesse, 1984, 1990, and Hall & Mairesse, 1995, for early, 
influential studies, or Hall et al., 2010, for a recent survey) we believe that this should not limit our examination 
to a large extent. 
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definition in Table 1), and, (iii) in alternative specifications separately for firms operating in 
rather weak versus strong institutional environments. 
To estimate differences in the effects of managerial experience on innovative 
performance we run regressions of innovation performance on managerial experience where 
we estimate separate slopes for firms in countries with well-developed institutions versus less 
developed institutions. This is implemented by estimating a slope for experience*EU and a 
different slope for experience*(1-EU) in the specifications where we presume that EU 
members have better developed institutions than the other countries in the sample, on 
average. We proceed analogously in the regressions where we use the Economic Freedom 
Index rather than the EU vs. non-EU comparison.  
As managerial experience might not be the only variable that affects corporate 
innovative activity, several control variables are added that could possibly confound the 
estimated relationship between ‘experience’ and innovation. Wherever available we took a 
lagged variable to minimize potential simultaneity issues.
9
 
Firms that invest into R&D will be both more likely to introduce new products and/or 
services and to be also more successful in commercializing those products. Hence, a binary 
control variable indicating whether the firm has invested into ‘R&D’ in the last three years is 
added to the regressions.
10
  
With the size of a company, which is measured by the logarithm of employees in period 
t-3, we control for the fact that larger firms might be able to realize economies of scale and 
scope in their innovation process.  
Younger firms might be more innovative than other firms as they have less 
standardized products and have usually not exploited all resources yet (cf. e.g. Kleinknecht 
                                                 
9
  As some variables are only available for the period t-3, for consistency reasons we choose to take also with 
regard to other variables, wherever possible, values from t-3.  
10
  We took a R&D dummy instead of the amount invested as the latter has unfortunately been missing too 
frequently in the raw data.  
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1996). Therefore, the logarithm of a firm’s age in t-3 is included as a further explanatory 
variable in the regression framework.  
In addition, we control for human capital intensity by the fraction of employees with a 
university degree, since a highly skilled workforce can be assumed to facilitate inventions of 
new products and their successful commercialization.  
Access to foreign markets is usually a strong incentive for firms to be innovative, 
because the reachable markets for new products tend to be larger and firms may learn through 
exporting. Thus, a dummy indicating whether the firm was exporting in t-3 is taken as 
another explanatory variable into account. 
Furthermore, we control for possible differences in innovative activity of state-owned 
and foreign-owned firms when compared to privately owned, domestic companies. Two 
dummy variables indicating firms that are state-owned or foreign-owned account for these 
specific kinds of ownership. 
Finally, we use one year dummy (the data is cross-sectional but the interviews were 
conducted during 2008 and 2009 in different countries), 17 industry dummies and 26 country 
dummies to control for unobserved heterogeneity over time, and across different industries 
and countries. Table 2 summarizes all variables used.  
Table 2 – Variable overview 
 
Variable Description Source 
New product/service 
Dummy indicating whether the firm has 
introduced a new product or service within 
the last three years 
BEEPS 
Innovation sales 
Annual percentage of sales accounted for by 
new products or services introduced in the 
last three years 
BEEPS 
R&D 
Dummy indicating whether the firm has 
invested in R&D in the last three years 
BEEPS 
Experience 
Number of years the top-manager of the firm 
works in the current industry 
BEEPS 
Employeest-3 Employment in physical units in t-3 BEEPS 
Aget-3 Age of the firm in years in t-3 BEEPS 
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Human capital 
Percentage of employees with a university 
degree 
BEEPS 
Exportt-3 
Dummy indicating whether the firm exported 
in t-3  
BEEPS 
State owned 
Dummy indicating whether the firm is 
wholly owned by the government  
BEEPS 
Foreign owned 
Dummy indicating whether the firm is 
wholly owned by a foreign individual or 
foreign firm 
BEEPS 
Institutional development Score of the Economic Freedom Index 
Heritage Foundation 
and Wall Street Journal  
EU 
Dummy indicating whether the firm is 
situated in a EU-member country 
European Union 
WI 
Dummy indicating whether the firm is 
situated in a country with weak institutions 
(Economic Freedom Index below median) 
Heritage Foundation 
and Wall Street Journal  
 
Table 3 contains the descriptive statistics, separated by EU-membership status.
11
 55% 
of the firms developed a new product within the last three years in EU countries and 52% in 
non-EU countries. With regard to the proportion of new product related sales we also see 
only slight differences in the average values of around 14% in both groups. The difference in 
the median values of 5% for firms situated in the EU and 2% for firms situated outside the 
EU stems largely from a somewhat higher fraction of innovative firms with relatively low 
proportions of innovation related sales inside the EU.  
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics  
 
EU-member 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
New product/service 2278 0.55 1 0.50 0 1 
Innovation sales 2278 13.47 5 20.94 0 100 
R&D dummy 2278 0.26 0 0.44 0 1 
Experience 2278 17.83 16 9.58 1 53 
Employees t-3 2278 87.29 22 370.30 1 15000 
Age t-3 2278 13.44 12 13.73 1 181 
Human capital 2278 15.93 10 21.51 0 100 
Export t-3 2278 0.31 0 0.46 0 1 
State owned 2278 0.02 0 0.13 0 1 
                                                 
11
 Descriptive statistics separated by the level of institutional development as measured by the Economic 
Freedom Index can be found in the appendix, Table A2.  
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Foreign owned 2278 0.13 0 0.34 0 1 
Institutional development 2278 66.41 66.60 4.43 60.30 76.40 
       
 
non-EU-member 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
New product/service 5528 0.52 1 0.50 0 1 
Innovation sales 5528 14.74 2 22.89 0 100 
R&D dummy 5528 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 
Experience 5528 16.92 15 10.67 1 75 
Employees t-3 5528 100.90 24 362.40 1 15000 
Age t-3 5528 14.48 10 16.69 1 178 
Human capital 5528 27.65 20 26.37 0 100 
Export t-3 5528 0.21 0 0.41 0 1 
State owned 5528 0.05 0 0.21 0 1 
Foreign owned 5528 0.08 0 0.26 0 1 
Institutional development 5528 56.47 56.60 6.02 45.30 69.90 
 
For our main variable of interested, managerial experience, we observe only slight 
average differences between EU and non-EU countries. This applies also to the median. 
Having a closer look at the distribution, however, reveals that in non-EU countries the 
proportion of firms led by relatively inexperienced top managers (i.e. 10 years and less) is 
much higher than in EU countries (see Figure 1). A similar pattern is also observed in Figure 
1 for the sample split by weak vs. strong institutions as defined by the economic freedom 
rating. 
Referring to the control variables we observe some structural differences between EU 
and non-EU countries. Interestingly, non-EU firms are larger, on average (101 versus 87 
employees in t-3) and have a higher fraction of employees with a university degree (28% 
versus 16%).
12
 EU firms are more internationalized as they exported in 31 out of 100 cases 
on average, compared to 21% exporting firms in non-EU countries. Additionally, EU firms 
are less likely to be state-owned (2% versus 5%), but more likely to be foreign owned (13% 
                                                 
12
 It might seem puzzling that the employees in countries with weaker institutions have on average a higher 
formal education than those in countries with well-developed countries. This is however frequently observed 
and owes to the fact that in countries with weaker institutions the quality standards for education are lower. We 
ran the subsequent regressions also with the human capital variable adjusted by the average education level per 
country and the results did not change. 
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versus 8%). The average age of a firm amounts with 13 (non-EU) and 14 (EU) years to 
similar values in both samples. 
Figure 1 – Sample distribution of managerial experience 
 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Regressions using the full sample 
Since a firm’s decision whether to innovate or not is indicated by a dichotomous 
variable, we use a Probit model to estimate the effect of experience on the probability to 
introduce a new product or service. For the proportion of sales accounted for by new products 
we use a Tobit model, which accounts for the censoring at zero occurring when firms did not 
introduce a new product or service. Both innovation proxies, new product or service 
introductions as well as sales from new products, are separately regressed on the logarithm of 
experience of the top-manager of each firm and all other above mentioned explanatory 
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variables.
13
 This approach leaves us with two basic specifications, one for each dependent 
variable. 
As heteroscedasticity in Probit and Tobit models would render coefficient estimates 
inconsistent, we conducted several tests. Finally, we specify the heteroscedasticity as 
groupwise multiplicatively where we allow the variance to vary across firm size, industries 
and countries. We use a full set of industry dummies and include three size dummies 
distinguishing four categories of firm sizes based on the quartiles of the employment 
distribution. In the Tobit models, we include a full set of country dummies. In the Probit 
models it turned out that it is sufficient to include three dummies of countries that show 
significantly different variance estimates from the other countries (see e.g. Verbeek, 2012, for 
technical details on estimating heteroscedastic Probit and Tobit models).
14
 Note further that 
all subsequently presented results are actually even more pronounced in terms of statistical 
significance when homoscedastic Probit and Tobit models are estimated. 
                                                 
13
 We also tested other functional forms of experience but did not find other significant results. Specifications of 
a hump-shaped slope were sometimes significant but with turning points close to the maximum of observed 
values of experience which confirms our findings using the logarithm of experience.  
14
 Note that, in the case of innovation sales, it would have been desirable to estimate Heckman-type selection 
models as more flexible version of the Tobit separating the decision to innovate and the success in terms of 
sales. However, in order to do so, we would require a convincing exclusion restriction, i.e. one variable that 
significantly determines the innovation decision that at the same time does not determine the sales of innovative 
products. As we do not have a good candidate for such a variable in our data, we restrict the analysis to Tobit 
models. 
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Table 4 – Innovative firm performance 
 
a b c d e f 
Dependent variable: New product Inno sales New product Inno sales New product Inno sales 
R&D dummy 0.963*** 19.864*** 0.957*** 19.845*** 0.971*** 19.850*** 
 
(0.118) (1.024) (0.117) (1.024) (0.119) (1.024) 
log(employeest-3) 0.030** 0.605* 0.029** 0.580 0.030** 0.589* 
 
(0.013) (0.355) (0.013) (0.355) (0.014) (0.355) 
log(aget-3) 0.008 -1.768*** 0.010 -1.734*** 0.011 -1.715*** 
 
(0.021) (0.569) (0.020) (0.569) (0.021) (0.570) 
Human capital 0.002*** 0.081*** 0.002*** 0.082*** 0.002*** 0.081*** 
 
(0.001) (0.020) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) (0.020) 
Exportt-3 0.281*** 5.429*** 0.280*** 5.476*** 0.282*** 5.400*** 
 
(0.056) (1.137) (0.056) (1.136) (0.057) (1.136) 
State owned -0.085 -4.279* -0.083 -4.201* -0.089 -4.300* 
 
(0.088) (2.333) (0.088) (2.337) (0.090) (2.335) 
Foreign owned 0.251*** 5.189*** 0.247*** 5.084*** 0.254*** 5.141*** 
 
(0.064) (1.408) (0.064) (1.408) (0.065) (1.408) 
log(experience) 0.042* 0.934 
     
(0.024) (0.635) 
    log(experience) x EU 
  
-0.069 -1.473 
   
  
(0.046) (1.202) 
  log(experience) x non-EU 
  
0.076*** 1.807** 
   
  
(0.027) (0.737) 
  log(experience) x SI 
    
0.000 -0.121 
 
    
(0.031) (0.898) 
log(experience) x WI 
    
0.093*** 1.924** 
          (0.036) (0.873) 
Joint significance of industry dummies χ2(17) 52.58*** 122.35*** 52.83*** 121.64*** 52.92*** 122.16*** 
Joint significance of country dummies χ2(25) 61.05*** 156.74*** 59.69*** 158.35*** 57.40*** 132.76*** 
No. of observations 7806 7806 7806 7806 7806 7806 
Pseudo R-squared 0.139 0.031 0.140 0.031 0.139 0.031 
Log-likelihood -4648.22 -22063.32 -4644.24 -22060.54 -4646.09 -22061.94 
LR test for heteroscedasticity χ2(44 or 23) 52.08*** 336.36*** 53.91*** 341.92*** 53.50*** 339.11*** 
Notes: Heteroscedastic Probit (a, c, e) and Tobit models (b, d, f); heteroscedasticity is modeled groupwise multiplicatively; heteroscedasticity term includes 3 size dummies, 17 industry 
dummies and 25 (3 in Probit) country dummies. All models include an intercept which is omitted in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Also note that the interaction variables EU, non-EU, SI and WI are not included as separate regressors as these effects are already captured by the full set of 
country dummies. 
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First of all we are interested in the overall effect of managerial experience on 
innovative firm performance. Table 4 models a and b present the according results. Model a 
shows a weak significant positive relation between managerial experience and the likelihood 
to introduce a new product or service but no significant effect on the sales stemming from 
newly introduced products. 
To further investigate whether the effect of managerial experience on innovative firm 
performance changes across different institutional environments, we split the experience 
variable into two variables, one measuring managerial experience in firms operating inside 
the EU (‘experience x EU’) and one variable measuring managerial experience in firms 
operating in non-EU-member states (‘experience x non-EU’). Both variables are mutually 
exclusive, meaning that they take zero values if firms operate in the excluded group of 
countries. This approach allows direct comparisons of the effects of managerial experience 
on innovative performance of firms operating inside in contrast to firms operating outside the 
EU. Similarly, as a kind of robustness check, we measure managerial experience in 
institutionally less developed countries (‘experience x WI’) and countries with relative strong 
institutions (‘experience x SI’) according to the economic freedom index of the Heritage 
Foundation. The regression results for the EU split are presented in columns c and d, and the 
regression results for the latter split are presented in columns e and f of Table 4.
15
 Note that 
we do not include a non-EU dummy or respectively weak institutions dummy separately in 
the regressions as this variation is fully captured by the set of country dummies. 
Table 4, models c and d, reveal that managerial experience has a significant positive 
influence on the probability to introduce a new product (c) as well as the proportion of new 
product sales (d), for those firms operating outside the EU. For firms situated inside the EU 
                                                 
15
 Note that all results also hold if the models are estimated with the subsamples of EU and non-EU countries 
and respectively strong and weak institutions separately. In the tables we present here, we implicitly assume that 
the coefficients of the other controls do not differ across the different sub-samples. As making the estimations 
more flexible in this respect did not yield any different results concerning our main hypotheses, we opt for the 
space-saving presentation of just interacting managerial experience with the institutional variables here.  
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the managerial experience coefficient turns insignificant in both models. Chi-squared tests on 
the difference between the experience coefficients for firms operating in the EU and outside 
the EU confirm that managerial experience has a statistically significant higher effect in the 
latter compared to the former region (one sided test, p-value = 0.004 [Probit], p-value = 0.009 
[Tobit]). 
With regard to the marginal effects this means, for instance, that the probability of 
introducing a new product by an average firm operating outside the EU rises by 13.7% if a 
non-experienced manager would be replaced by a manager that has 10 additional years of 
experience.
16
 The same exchange is associated with a 14.2% increase in the proportion of 
sales accounted for by new products, which indicates that firms with more experienced 
managers are not only more innovative but also more successful in commercializing their 
inventions. 
Represented in the logarithmic specification, the marginal returns of managerial 
experience descend with increasing years of experience. Replacing a manager that has 
already 10 years of industry-specific experience by one who can look back on 20 years of 
experiences increases the probability to introduce a new product at a relatively low level of 
3.9% (4.4% when new product-related sales are considered). This is in line with the intuitive 
interpretation that the first years of industry-specific experiences are the most valuable. After 
ten years working in an industry managers have probably accumulated most of the 
knowledge that is needed, for instance, to deal effectively with governmental matters or how 
to write and enforce contracts when external institutions are weak. During the first decade 
working in an industry managers are most likely also able to build up reliable relationships 
with customers, suppliers and capable employees. Such a connectedness with key actors 
within an industry is probably most important to profitably innovate in less developed regions 
                                                 
16
 Note that we calculate the relative change from the mean here rather than the change in percentage points. The 
corresponding change for the marginal effect of 13.7% as mentioned above would mean that the likelihood to 
innovate changes from 52% (sample mean) to about 59%.  
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and may explain a large part of the positive relationship found between managerial 
experience and innovative firm performance.  
As previously mentioned, we alternatively re-grouped firms according to the median 
level of institutional development, as measured by the economic freedom index of the 
Heritage Foundation. This allows us to complement and test the robustness of the results 
derived from the EU-split, which suggests that managerial experience is most valuable in less 
developed institutional surroundings. Models e and f of Table 5 show the corresponding 
regressions. 
Again managerial experience of the top-manager is only significantly and positively 
related to the probability of introducing a new product (e) and new product related sales (f) 
for firms situated in weakly developed countries, while managerial experience has no 
significant influence on corporate innovative activity of firms situated in more developed 
regions (coefficients are again statistically different, one sided test, p-value = 0.023 [Probit], 
p-value = 0.049 [Tobit]). Compared with the results of models c and d, the estimated 
coefficients of managerial experience in the sub sample of weakly developed countries are 
slightly higher than in the non EU-member subsample. More precisely, for an average firm 
operating in weakly developed environments an exchange of a non-experienced manager by a 
manager that has 10 additional years of industry-specific experience is associated with a 
16.7% rise in the probability of introducing a new product or service, while the proportion of 
shares from newly introduced products would rise by 15.7%. These results suggest that the 
only weakly significant positive (model a) and insignificant effect of managerial experience 
on innovative firm performance (model b) in the full-sample are driven by the group of firms 
operating in rather well developed institutional surroundings.  
A reasoning consistent with these findings is that managerial experience substitutes for 
institutional shortfalls in ways like offering reputation, trustworthiness, and personal contacts 
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to the government, customers and suppliers. It is known from the literature that institutional 
shortfalls like weak contract enforcement, political instability and uncertain prospects of 
future developments hamper firms’ efforts to introduce new products and chances to 
commercialize innovations successfully. Hence, managerial reputation for contract fulfilling, 
for instance, becomes more important the weaker contracts are enforceable by court. Similar, 
experience in how to cope with governmental obstacles is most important in environments 
where governments are less predictable. Regardless of the exact channels through which 
managerial experience affects firms’ decisions to innovate, they point all to the fact that 
experience of the top-manager reduces uncertainty on future returns on innovations, which is 
generally more valuable the less reliable the institutional environment. 
4.2 Small firms vs. large firms 
The empirical analysis points out that the top-manager of a firm has an important 
influence on the decision to innovate and the success of the commercialization of new 
products. This influence might be especially pronounced in small firms, where the success of 
the firm hinges more than in large firms on the knowledge, connectedness and reputation of 
one single person leading the firm. For suppliers, customers and employees of small firms the 
top-manager will often be the first person to negotiate with. Adding to this, crucial 
knowledge on how to commercialize new products and how to cope with governmental 
obstacles is often solely provided by the top-manager. Against this background, it is 
reasonable to expect that top-manager experience becomes more important for innovative 
firm performance of small firms compared to rather large ones. 
Small firms are further of particular interest as they constitute the far majority of firms 
in Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover are innovative small firms often 
considered as the fastest growing firms within an industry that have the highest impact on 
economic growth (e.g., among many others, Schneider & Veugelers, 2010, Czarnitzki & 
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Delanote, 2012). Supplementing our previous analysis, we hence examine the influence of 
industry-specific experience of the top-manager on the probability to introduce new products 
as well as new product-related sales, separately for small and larger firms. We follow the 
European Commission in defining small firms as having less than 50 employees. All other 
firms are considered as one group of medium-sized and large firms.
17
 After separating these 
two groups of firms we run our baseline models of the decision to innovate and new product 
sales, as introduced in the previous subsection, separately for both groups. Since we know 
already that the experience effects vary significantly between institutionally more and less 
developed regions, we present only those models that allow to compare the experience effect 
for firms operating in the EU and outside the EU, and in better and less developed countries, 
respectively. This leaves us with 8 models, which are presented in table 6. Columns a to d 
show the results for small firms, while columns e to h comprise the results for medium-sized 
and large firms.  
The regression results obtained for small firms are comparable to the full-sample 
results. Industry-specific experience of the top-manager has a significant positive effect on 
the probability that a small firm operating outside the EU introduces a new product (model a) 
and on the success in commercializing those new products (model b). The same applies for 
small firms operating in environments of low economic freedom (models c and d). No 
significant effect of managerial experience on innovative firm performance is found for small 
firms operating in better developed institutional environments. From models e to f follows 
that, regardless of the institutional environment, experience seems to have no influence on 
innovative firm performance in medium-sized and large firms.  
                                                 
17
 In alternative specifications we also examined the influence of top-manager experience separately for medium 
sized firms (> 50 and up to 250 employees in t-3) and large firms (> 250 employees in t-3). Since the results did 
not change notably between medium-sized and large firms, we put both groups together in regressions presented 
here.  
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Table 5 – Small and large firms  
 Small firms (≤ 50 employees) larger firms (> 50 employees) 
 
a b c d e f g h 
Dependent variable: New product Inno sales New product Inno sales New product Inno sales New product Inno sales 
R&D 0.752*** 22.836*** 0.760*** 22.808*** 1.300*** 15.605*** 1.308*** 15.626*** 
 
(0.135) (1.352) (0.137) (1.351) (0.232) (1.462) (0.233) (1.462) 
log(employeest-3) 0.048** 1.665** 0.049** 1.635** -0.013 -0.264 -0.014 -0.239 
 
(0.021) (0.727) (0.021) (0.726) (0.048) (0.845) (0.048) (0.844) 
log(aget-3) 0.005 -2.117*** 0.003 -2.124*** -0.008 -1.007 -0.008 -1.014 
 
(0.021) (0.804) (0.021) (0.804) (0.043) (0.782) (0.043) (0.782) 
Human capital 0.002** 0.067*** 0.002** 0.066*** 0.006*** 0.114*** 0.006*** 0.113*** 
 
(0.001) (0.023) (0.001) (0.023) (0.002) (0.037) (0.002) (0.037) 
Exportt-3 0.247*** 6.916*** 0.250*** 6.808*** 0.412*** 4.644*** 0.406*** 4.616*** 
 
(0.062) (1.522) (0.063) (1.521) (0.118) (1.596) (0.118) (1.595) 
State owned -0.086 -4.028 -0.095 -4.177 -0.020 -2.246 -0.022 -2.291 
 
(0.118) (4.434) (0.119) (4.434) (0.150) (2.565) (0.152) (2.563) 
Foreign owned 0.235*** 6.587*** 0.240*** 6.633*** 0.280** 3.774** 0.289** 3.785** 
 
(0.076) (2.098) (0.077) (2.097) (0.118) (1.816) (0.119) (1.816) 
log(experience) x EU -0.063 -1.389 
  
-0.083 -1.600 
  
 
(0.048) (1.626) 
  
(0.100) (1.694) 
  
log(experience) x non-EU 0.077** 3.315*** 
  
0.062 -0.059 
  
 
(0.031) (1.043) 
  
(0.054) (0.989) 
  
log(experience) x SI 
  
0.005 0.420 
  
0.005 -0.750 
   
(0.031) (1.190) 
  
(0.070) (1.282) 
log(experience) x WI 
  
0.100** 3.883*** 
  
0.051 -0.203 
      (0.041) (1.291)     (0.066) (1.145) 
Joint significance of industry dummies χ2(17) 22.91 83.71*** 22.72 83.40*** 29.46** 70.52*** 29.21** 70.84*** 
Joint significance of country dummies χ2(25) 28.84 133.06*** 29.34 116.86*** 31.95 70.75*** 29.72 62.35*** 
No. of observations 5318 5318 5318 5318 2488 2488 2488 2488 
Pseudo R-squared 0.128 0.032 0.127 0.032 0.191 0.041 0.190 0.041 
Log-likelihood -3214.77 -14565.14 -3216.20 -14566.20 -1370.10 -7386.00 -1370.85 -7386.27 
LR test for heteroscedasticity χ2(45, 44, 22 or 21) 38.15** 227.75*** 37.06** 225.64*** 38.15** 235.12*** 38.04** 234.59*** 
Notes: Heteroscedastic Probit (a, c, e, g) and Tobit models (b, d, f, h); heteroscedasticity is modeled groupwise multiplicatively; heteroscedasticity term includes 2 (1 in medium/large firms’ 
sample) size dummies, 17 industry dummies and 25 (3 in Probit) country dummies. All models include an intercept which is omitted in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Also note that the interaction variables EU, non-EU, SI and WI are not included as separate regressors as these effects are 
already captured by the full set of country dummies. 
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Looking at the size of the coefficients reveals that the experience effect stayed roughly 
the same for the decision to innovate for small firms compared to the effects revealed for the 
full sample of firms. The experience effect became larger, however, with regard to new 
product related sales of small firms, which is in line with the conjecture that the top-manager 
in general and managerial experience in particular is more important for small firms 
compared to large ones. Chi-squared tests on the difference between the experience 
coefficients of small versus medium and large firms in less developed countries actually 
confirm this perception statistically (one sided test; outside the EU: p-value = 0.004 [Probit], 
p-value = 0.008 [Tobit]; weak institutions: p-value = 0.005 [Probit], p-value = 0.014 [Tobit]). 
With regard to the marginal effects this means, for instance, that exchanging a top-
manager of a small firm, operating outside the EU, with one year of industry-specific 
experience with a manager having 10 more years of experience is associated with a 14.5% 
(18.8% in weak institutional environments) higher likelihood of new product introductions. 
The same exchange leads on average to a 24.7% (30.8% in weak institutional environments) 
higher proportion of sales accounted for by new products. Both effects are, thus, not only 
statistically significant but also economically significant. Following the logarithmic 
specification, the marginal effects diminish with rising years of industry-specific experience. 
Ten additional years of industry-specific experience of a top-manager of a small firm, who 
has already ten years of experience, are associated with a relatively low increase in the 
probability to introduce a new product of 4.2% (5.3% in weak institutional environments) and 
a 8.0% (10.1% in weak institutional environments) increase in new product related sales. 
4.3 Potential endogeneity of managerial experience 
A potential caveat of our study might be that managerial experience cannot be 
considered as an exogenous variable which would imply an inconsistent estimation of its 
effect on innovative firm activity. More experienced managers might self-select to lead more 
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innovative firms, or firms that are intending to enhance their innovative firm performance 
may try to hire more experienced managers. We address these concerns first by checking for 
potential endogeneity of managerial experience in our empirical models based on Rivers & 
Vuong (1988) tests in case of the Probit models, and Smith & Blundell (1986) tests in case of 
the Tobit models.  
Both tests require at least one instrument for the potential endogenous variable in 
question. We use the average managerial experience at an aggregated 2-digit industry level 
by country and region as well as the average managerial experience at each company size 
quartile by industry and country as instruments. Both instruments characterize the 
environment in which the firm operates. The notion behind using industry level instruments is 
that a single firm is presumably not able to significantly influence an industry but may be 
influenced by the behavior of its peer group in the same industry (Jaffe, 1986). 
In a first step we regress managerial experience on all explanatory variables and the 
instruments (industry-region averages and industry-firm size class averages per country), 
using standard OLS regressions. The results confirm that both instruments are relevant as 
they are individually significant at the 1% level. In a second step we include the predicted 
residuals of this model as an additional regressor in our Probit and Tobit models of 
innovative firm performance. The estimated coefficient for the residuals are the test statistics 
for the null hypotheses of exogeneity of managerial experience (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 474). 
Exogeneity is actually never rejected at a reasonable statistical significance level of 10% or 
lower (p-values ranging between 0.465 and 0.955). 
We address Staiger & Stock’s (1997) concern that endogeneity tests might be 
misleading if the instruments are weak. Therefore, we further checked the partial correlation 
between the potential endogenous variable and the instruments. If the partial F-statistic for 
the instruments exceeds 10, Staiger & Stock (1997) propose that the instruments in question 
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are not weak. Within our regression framework we found F-values ranging between 158.07 
and 598.10 suggesting that we do not face a weak instrument problem. 
Finally, we tested with Amemiya-Lee-Newey (Lee, 1992, and Newey, 1987) 
overidentification tests for Probit and Tobit models whether the instruments used are valid, 
meaning they are uncorrelated with the error term of the innovation equations. Since the null 
hypothesis of no error term correlation is never rejected (p-values ranging between 0.194 and 
0.994) we conclude that both instruments are valid. Given these test results, the managerial 
experience effect estimated in our empirical investigation seems not to be biased by an 
endogenous relation with innovative firm performance. 
Considering only sole proprietorships 
As some readers may not find the instrumental variables used in the preceding test 
convincing, as for instance, one would prefer instrumental variables varying at the firm level, 
we offer another, conceptually different, robustness test. In this second attempt to address 
potential concerns regarding the exogeneity of managerial experience in our regression 
framework, we re-estimate our baseline models on the subsample of firms that are run under 
the legal form ‘sole proprietorship’ and have less than 50 employees. The notion behind this 
test is that within the sample of sole proprietorships at least two sources of endogeneity, 
namely self-selection of experienced managers to more innovative firms and corresponding 
recruiting practices, are most likely not taking place. The main reason for this assumption is 
that sole proprietorships include an unlimited liability of the owner of the firm. Under such 
circumstances it is rarely observed that firms separate ownership and control rights. Hence, 
the industry-specific experience of an owner-manager is not influenced by selection effects in 
the market of top-managers. In addition, we restrict the sample of sole proprietorships to 
firms that have at maximum 50 employees, as it is most likely that owners of such firms are 
not willing to give up control. Although we cannot surely rule out that a fully liable owner of 
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a small sole proprietorship hires a person helping with managerial tasks, we believe that cases 
where the owner gives up control and is thus no longer identified as the “top manager” in the 
survey interviews is highly unlikely.
18
 The corresponding estimations are presented in Table 
7. Note that we had to aggregate some industries because of the smaller samples and that 
three countries were excluded completely from this robustness tests because of small 
numbers of observations. 
Table 7 – Sole proprietorships  
 
a b c d 
Dependent variable New product Inno sales New product Inno sales 
R&D 0.959*** 19.950*** 0.949*** 19.782*** 
 
(0.141) (3.513) (0.141) (3.532) 
log(employeest-3) 0.018 0.373 0.023 0.346 
 
(0.054) (1.635) (0.054) (1.629) 
log(aget-3) 0.009 1.761 0.008 1.745 
 
(0.065) (1.938) (0.065) (1.912) 
Human capital 0.001 0.058 0.001 0.060 
 
(0.002) (0.054) (0.002) (0.053) 
Exportt-3 0.574*** 14.645*** 0.578*** 14.801*** 
 
(0.163) (4.172) (0.164) (4.204) 
Foreign owned 0.753 -1.319 0.747 -0.360 
 
(0.465) (9.551) (0.461) (9.311) 
log(experience) x EU -0.173 -8.729* 
  
 
(0.170) (4.553) 
  
log(experience) x non-EU 0.212** 7.545*** 
  
 
(0.085) (2.626) 
  
log(experience) x SI 
  
-0.095 -5.728* 
   
(0.124) (3.473) 
log(experience) x WI 
  
0.273*** 9.013*** 
      (0.095) (2.716) 
Joint significance of industry dummies χ2(12) 21.29** 15.19 21.24** 15.04 
Joint significance of country dummies χ2(22) 74.59*** 52.49*** 69.25*** 51.66*** 
No. of observations 998 998 998 998 
Pseudo R-squared 0.144 0.049 0.145 0.049 
Log-likelihood -587.22 -2455.57 -586.40 -2454.58 
LR test for heteroscedasticity χ2(37) - 66.46*** - 225.64*** 
Notes: Heteroscedastic Probit (a, c) and Tobit models (b, d); heteroscedasticity is modeled groupwise multiplicatively; 
heteroscedasticity term includes 2 size dummies, 12 industry dummies and 22 country dummies. All models include an 
intercept which is omitted in the table. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate a significance level of 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively. Also note that the interaction variables EU, non-EU, SI and WI are not included as separate 
regressors as these effects are already captured by the full set of country dummies. 
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 More experienced managers running their own business might be hired by other firms and, thus, select 
themselves out of the sample. This kind of self-selection, if it takes place, is of much less concern as it would 
imply an underestimation of the experience effect rather than an overestimation. 
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All regressions show qualitatively the same results as previously presented. The effect 
of managerial experience on new product introductions as well as new product related sales is 
always highly significant and positive for firms operating outside the EU and, more 
generally, in less developed institutional surroundings. Although not all possible estimation 
biases and alternative theoretical explanations can be ruled out by this approach, the results 
are reassuring in the sense that we should not be concerned of severely biased coefficients of 
managerial experience due to self-selection of experienced managers to more innovative 
firms. 
5. Conclusion  
The present paper provides evidence of a positive influence of industry-specific 
experience of the top-manager on the likelihood that firms introduce new products as well as 
the proportion of new product related sales. Both effects are particularly pronounced for 
small firms operating outside the EU or, more general, in weak institutional environments. In 
contrast, firms that are situated in the EU or operate in more developed institutional 
environments seem not to profit from higher industry-specific experience of the top-manager, 
regardless of their size.  
We interpret these findings as support for the perception that managerial experience 
affects innovative firm performance largely indirectly, for instance, by superior knowledge 
on how to protect new inventions from being imitated, how to cope with governmental 
obstacles or how to commercialize new products. All these issues are presumably more 
essential for the decision to innovate and commercial success when external institutions are 
rather weak. Managerial experience thus substitutes for institutional shortfalls, like weak 
contract enforcement or political instability via reputation and knowledge on how to cope 
with institutional obstacles. While the BEEPS data do not allow disentangling the exact 
channels through which managerial experience affects a firm’s decision to innovate, the 
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present study has still important practical implications for policy makers, shareholders and 
investors. Since more experienced managers foster more innovative firm activities and 
thereby economic growth, countries with weak institutions may want to take experience of 
the top-manager into account when they decide, for instance, on subsidies for firms’ R&D 
investments or foundations of new establishments. Shareholders that want to implement 
successful innovation strategies in institutionally weak environments should consider to do 
give leadership to the most experienced managers available. Similarly, potential investors 
that want to enter foreign markets may want to hire relatively experienced managers. Overall, 
our examination points out that building up industry-specific experiences might be a crucial 
factor to achieve sustainable firm growth and competitiveness, especially when external 
institutions a rather weak. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 - Correlation matrix 
  
New 
product 
/service 
Inno sales 
R&D, 
dummy 
Experience 
Employees 
t-3  
Aget-3 
Human 
capital 
Exportt-3 State owned 
Foreign 
owned 
EU 
Institutional 
development 
New product/service 1.000 
           
Inno sales 0.608 1.000 
          
R&D, dummy 0.317 0.226 1.000 
         
Experience 0.003 0.004 0.059 1.000 
        
Employeest-3 0.046 0.004 0.087 0.028 1.000        
Aget-3 0.031 -0.023 0.088 0.185 0.188 1.000       
Human capital 0.059 0.060 0.039 -0.094 -0.018 -0.086 1.000 
     
Exportt-3 0.157 0.102 0.224 0.085 0.127 0.125 -0.074 1.000     
State owned -0.014 -0.039 0.020 -0.026 0.133 0.194 -0.013 0.010 1.000 
   
Foreign owned 0.075 0.042 0.050 -0.061 0.085 -0.002 0.036 0.179 0.039 1.000 
  
EU 0.026 -0.026 0.018 0.040 -0.017 -0.030 -0.208 0.102 -0.071 0.089 1.000 
 
Institutional development -0.031 -0.042 -0.011 0.054 -0.054 -0.096 -0.102 0.090 -0.114 0.069 0.628 1.000 
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Table A2 – Descriptive statistics 
 
Strong institutions 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
New product/service 4447 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
Innovation sales 4447 13.60 1 22.06 0 100 
R&D dummy 4447 0.24 0 0.43 0 1 
Experience 4447 18.21 15 10.70 1 75 
Employeest-3 4447 84.45 22 306.70 1 15000 
Aget-3 4447 12.84 11 12.59 1 181 
Human capital 4447 21.79 10 25.79 0 100 
Exportt-3 4447 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 
State owned 4447 0.02 0 0.14 0 1 
Foreign owned 4447 0.10 0 0.30 0 1 
Institutional development 4447 64.56 63.20 4.61 59.90 76.40 
       
 
Weak institutions 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
New product/service 3359 0.55 1 0.50 0 1 
Innovation sales 3359 15.39 5 22.68 0 100 
R&D dummy 3359 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 
Experience 3359 15.83 14 9.76 1 66 
Employeest-3 3359 113.50 25 429.10 1 15000 
Aget-3 3359 15.95 10 19.27 1 178 
Human capital 3359 27.46 20 25.01 0 100 
Exportt-3 3359 0.18 0 0.39 0 1 
State owned 3359 0.07 0 0.25 0 1 
Foreign owned 3359 0.08 0 0.27 0 1 
Institutional development 3359 52.50 51 3.09 45.30 58.20 
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